A little over ten years ago, in July 2015, I stepped down as Chair of the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB) after eleven years at the helm—a tenure that made me the second-longest-serving chair in the board’s history, behind only its inaugural chair, Judge C. O. Bick.

In those years, I also served as a Director and President of the Ontario Association of Police Services Boards and the Canadian Association of Police Boards (since renamed the Canadian Association for Police Governance). In those roles locally, provincially, and nationally, I was deeply involved in efforts to strengthen civilian police governance through training, policy development, education, and advocacy.

When I left office, I hoped that the foundation had been laid to take civilian police governance in Toronto and more broadly to the next stage—a stage marked by a board-led agenda focused on systemic transformation, binding human rights policies, rigorous line-by-line financial oversight, and active community engagement. Instead, a decade later, I find myself routinely answering calls from journalists, academic researchers, and even currently serving board members asking for context, analysis, and basic historical background.

Why is it, I wonder, that the voice of a police board chair or member is so rarely heard commenting on or explaining a developing or ongoing event involving the police?

There is clearly a vacuum.

Over the past decade, civilian police governance across Ontario and Canada has taken a major step back due to a catastrophic loss of institutional memory and democratic resolve. Too many police boards have quietly abandoned their statutory responsibility to govern, retreating into administrative passivity and acting as cheerleaders and rubber stamps for police leadership.

Police services boards, composed of ordinary citizens and elected municipal politicians, were established to be a vital instrument of civilian governance as a cornerstone of democratic policing. Today, they appear to have defaulted into what I called “a symbolic illusion of accountability” in my 2018 book, Excessive Force: Toronto’s Fight to Reform City Policing.

Hiding behind elaborate administrative processes—public meetings, consultation exercises—to project a reassuring appearance of democratic oversight, police boards today maintain the status quo, absorb public criticism, shield police executives from genuine scrutiny, and actively reverse hard-won gains of the past.

1. Dissent in an Era of Ferment: Where is Governance?

Events across the world since roughly 2020 indicate that we are living through a period of intense economic, political, and social turmoil. People and communities struggling to survive—facing severe challenges in housing affordability, healthcare, and access to adequate food, while distressed by environmental crises and their governments’ complicity in violations of international law—are taking to the streets to exercise their fundamental rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, and political dissent.

I am reminded of the caution expressed by the eminent Canadian academic, Thomas Homer-Dixon, at a national conference of police governors that we hosted in Toronto. Speaking on policing in the context of globalization, Homer-Dixon demonstrated how global events inevitably become local community safety and policing issues. He encouraged police governors to pay close attention to global events and proactively plan for their local impact.

Yet what is the police response to these local, national, and global social-political-economic events? Increasingly, it consists of militarized force, AI-driven surveillance, the suppression of free expression, and the routine criminalization of protest under the sweeping banner of “national security” or “counter-terrorism.” In effect, civilian governance has surrendered its role to the very entity it is mandated to govern.

In the face of an aggressive policing posture, where is civilian governance? Where are the binding board policies ensuring that policing remains proportional, non-discriminatory, and strictly compliant with the Charter rights that Canada guarantees all its residents?

A case in point is the response of the Toronto Police Services Board to today’s challenges. This board governs Canada’s largest municipal force, which is also one of North America’s biggest. It used to be said that what Toronto does today, other boards will do tomorrow.

The Toronto police board committed in its Strategic Plan to update its policies to comply with Ontario’s new Community Safety and Policing Act. Yet, as recent submissions from the Law Union of Ontario highlight, foundational policies—such as those governing demonstrations and protests—remain grossly outdated, biased, and silent on fundamental constitutional guarantees. The board established no binding policy parameters beforehand and demanded no post-operation accountability afterward. Instead of directing the Police Chief to respect constitutional freedoms, the board defers uncritically to a misguided interpretation of “operational independence.”

In effect, the board has given the police service it governs—and its Chief—a free hand in managing the public’s right to free speech and the expression of dissent.

2. The Unchecked Economics of Policing: The Peel Example

Across Canada and Ontario, the cost of policing is skyrocketing disproportionately compared to every other essential municipal service. Nationally, municipal policing expenditures have surged by over 40 percent over the past decade, topping $18.5 billion annually. In Ontario, policing consistently consumes between 15 and 25 percent of total municipal operating budgets. While municipal investments in public health, affordable housing, homelessness support, mental health infrastructure, and youth programming are starved, police budgets swallow the lion’s share of local tax revenues.

Yet police boards approve these escalating budget requests completely unmindful of the broader economic environment or the fiscal strain on local taxpayers.

The case of Peel Region is an appalling example of this governance failure. As reported by The Pointer, Peel Regional Police secured an unprecedented 23.3 percent budget increase in a single year—adding $144 million to bring their operating budget toward $750 million—following a 14 percent hike the previous year.

When interviewed by The Pointer regarding this massive surge, I described it as “an utter failure of governance” and “highway robbery” abetted by municipal passivity. Under Ontario law, police boards are legally required to consider, examine, and approve the police budget before submitting it to city council. The Peel board approved the historic increase sought by the Peel Chief of Police with no financial analysis, no external auditing, and no meaningful questioning. When elected municipal leaders attempted to send the budget back for scrutiny, the door was slammed shut.

3. Opening the Tap: Expansion of Force Size Without Evidence

At one time, the Toronto police board strictly controlled the size of the police force. During my tenure as Chair, the board implemented hiring freezes, demanded operational efficiencies, and pushed for the civilianization of non-enforcement roles. There is no evidence that these actions of the board negatively affected delivery of policing services or made the city less safe. Yet today, boards like Toronto’s, actively supported by city halls, have opened the tap wide to expand the size of their police services.

Toronto’s police budget now stands at an extraordinary $1.43 billion—a 7 percent increase in a single year, and a massive expansion over the decade since I left. A large chunk of this year-over-year increase is tied to hiring hundreds of additional police officers in each of the next three years.

What is the justification for this massive expansion? What supportive evidence, empirical research, or independent rationale was evaluated by the board before approving the hiring of hundreds of additional armed officers?

A decade ago, we relied on an independent board secretariat staffed by subject-matter experts to scrutinize such claims. Today, excepting basic administrative support, the TPSB has let go of all staff members who possessed substantive policy or research expertise. It is evident from the board’s public record that it has undertaken no significant, board-led policy work in over a decade. By gutting its own internal expertise, the board has surrendered its ability to examine and question police claims, choosing instead to rubber-stamp multi-million-dollar staffing requests without a shred of independent verification.

4. The Degradation of Democratic Process: The Hamilton Example

By law, police boards are required to conduct their business in public. Private or confidential meetings are permitted only for a strictly defined list of matters such as personnel discipline, sensitive legal issues, or proprietary business negotiations. Boards are expected to establish and uphold transparent rules of procedure, foster collegial debate, and welcome public input as essential democratic friction.

Instead, boards today appear to have devolved into autocratic, closed-door bodies that are dismissive of the public and hostile to internal debate.

Hamilton provides a textbook example of this decay. There, Councillor Cameron Kroetsch publicly questioned an “undemocratic” budget process where board members received complex, line-by-line financial presentations barely 24 hours before deliberations. Rather than conducting rigorous public reviews, the board allowed budget oversight to shrink into non-public, poorly attended committee meetings, supinely transferring financial authority to the Police Chief. Remarkably and shockingly, the Police Chief was permitted to dictate the operating budget of the very board that employs him!

When some board members attempted to bring community concerns to the table or ask tough questions, they were met with hostility, discourtesy, and procedural silencing. This hostile governance culture ultimately led to the resignation of Dr. Anjali Menezes, a physician deeply rooted in the community and committed to representing its interests. In her letter of resignation after three frustrating years, Dr. Menezes called for the Hamilton board to be dismantled, warning that her colleagues acted as “cheerleaders” for the police rather than independent overseers.

Concurrently, public participation across municipal police boards has been systematically degraded: deputation times are drastically curtailed, meetings are scheduled at inconvenient hours for working residents, and public input is pre-screened to manage access. When a board fears public input and penalizes dissenting members, it ceases to function as a democratic body.

Reclaiming the Statutory Authority to Govern

In a preview of his paper, “The Illusion of Oversight,” Cal Corley, CEO of the Community Safety Knowledge Alliance, notes that major public inquiries—from the Morden Report on the G20 to the Rouleau Commission—have consistently found that police boards lack the standing, knowledge, or resolve to hold police services accountable. Corley points to structural deficits and a widespread misunderstanding of “operational independence.” Full disclosure: I consider Cal Corley a friend with whom I share a common analysis of the state of Canadian policing and the need for transformation.

While those structural deficits exist, the core reality is deeply political: boards have supinely abdicated their power.

Civilian police governance was never meant to be comfortable, and it was certainly never intended to function as a public relations department for police chiefs. It was established as a firm, democratic safeguard to ensure that an institution possessing a state monopoly on legal force remains strictly subject to public control.

Restoring the credibility and authority of civilian oversight will not happen through minor administrative tweaks. It requires board members who possess the courage to ask blunt questions, demand line-by-line financial transparency, rebuild independent policy expertise, and exercise their full statutory authority. Until that happens, civilian police oversight in Canada will remain nothing more than an expensive, symbolic illusion.

10 responses

  1. L.A. Smallwood Avatar
    L.A. Smallwood

    This is so true and sadly I think it is the way our political leadership wants it to stay.

  2. wealthisnotmoney Avatar

    Thanks for lucidly highlighting this pervasive issue. One wonders whether some Council members have ever been introduced to Corporate Governance rules? Or, are these members merely showcasing themselves?

    1. Alok Mukherjee Avatar

      You are right to wonder about knowledge and understanding of governance rules. Council members and police board members receive no proper training in or introduction to governance. They do have conferences, webinars, etc. but those are largely subject matter related.

  3. Arun P Mukherjee Avatar

    It is disheartening to see the slide in police oversight and an exponential increase in police budgets. We Toronto citizens are paying through our nose for our own incarceration by the police services, which are no longer “services” but autocratic and arbitrary exercise of power against our Charter rights. It makes me furious to hear about police storming people’s homes and charging them as terrorists just because they stand up for Palestinian rights.

  4. Mitch Blackburn Avatar
    Mitch Blackburn

    In reading this article I find myself totally agreeing with many or all of the points the author highlights giving my experiences as a former police officer who was hired twice and fired twice by the same police service, namely, the Niagara Regional Police Force/Service. When I sought accountability from the police chief and the police board chairman in trying to secure the thirteen years of police service for my upcoming OMERS pension they dismissed my complaint citing that I had signed a Minute of Settlement in 1997 rejecting my first 7 years of service when I was reinstated in June 1997 after a wrongful termination of employment. That was and is completely false. Everything that I was entitled to receive financially i signed for including my earned seven years of pension. Why would I agree to reject my 7 years of pension. It makes no sense yet the police chairman and board held fast to their decision that I did. That was in 2019 and since I wasn’t securing my OMERS pension at that time I put off my fight until I reach 65, which is just over 14 months from now. The last six years of my police service they have no objection giving me my pension citing I didn’t not sign it away. Why would I do so in 1997 and not in 2019. Giving the racial insensitivity of this particular police board I am of the view that I will be in another legal fight to secure the other 7 years of my OMERS pension in light of the fact it was this same police board that upheld both of my wrongful termination in 1990 and 2003.

    1. Alok Mukherjee Avatar

      Thank you for telling us about your experience of seeking just treatment from your Chief and the board, your employer. The boards must act independently and make decisions on merit. I hope responses like yours and the many others I am receiving on other platforms will persuade boards to provide the governance that they are expected to under the law and community expectations.

  5. Arun Mukherjee Avatar
    Arun Mukherjee

    While Boards were created to provide accountability, just as the US congress and the Supreme Court were created to provide the US President in check, these institutions have given in to the unbridled power of the Supreme Leader, be it the police chief or the President. We need ordinary people to keep these institutions in check.

  6. DIONE VALENTINE Avatar
    DIONE VALENTINE

    Alok, your paper raises an important and deeply consequential question about the state of civilian police governance in Canada. What I found particularly compelling is that the issue you identify extends beyond whether police boards are technically fulfilling their statutory responsibilities. The deeper concern is whether these institutions continue to possess the capacity, institutional memory, independence, and willingness to govern effectively.

    Your observation regarding the loss of institutional memory is especially significant. You describe a period in which police boards sought to exercise a more substantive governance role through policy development, financial scrutiny, human rights frameworks, community engagement, and independent expertise. Yet, a decade later, you argue that much of that capacity has diminished, with boards increasingly assuming an administrative or supportive role rather than functioning as independent governing bodies.

    This raises an important distinction between organizational change and organizational learning. Institutions may introduce reforms following a crisis, public inquiry, leadership change, or period of intense public scrutiny. Policies may be rewritten, committees established, training introduced, and accountability mechanisms created. However, the existence of those changes does not necessarily demonstrate that learning has become embedded within the institution.

    Your analysis suggests something even more important: institutional learning can potentially erode over time.

    The dismantling of independent policy and research capacity within the Toronto Police Services Board provides a particularly strong example. As you note, an earlier governance model relied upon an independent secretariat with substantive expertise capable of scrutinizing claims, conducting policy analysis, and providing the board with an independent basis for decision-making. The loss of that expertise potentially changes not only how decisions are made but the board’s very capacity to challenge, question, and govern the police service independently.

    That leads me to an important question prompted by your paper: How does governance capacity evolve over time, and what happens when the institutional mechanisms that once supported learning and accountability are gradually removed?

    The distinction matters because an institution may retain all the visible architecture of governance—boards, public meetings, policies, consultation processes, strategic plans, and reporting requirements—while simultaneously losing the substantive capacity that gave those mechanisms meaning. Your description of this as a “symbolic illusion of accountability” captures that tension particularly well.

    Your discussion of police budgets further demonstrates the consequences. Governance is not simply about approving or rejecting a budget; it requires the institutional capacity to interrogate assumptions, examine evidence, consider alternatives, and independently assess whether requests are justified. The examples you provide from Peel and Toronto raise serious questions about whether boards are exercising that governance function or merely legitimizing decisions developed elsewhere.

    I also found your discussion of “operational independence” particularly important. When the concept becomes interpreted so broadly that boards hesitate to establish meaningful policy parameters or demand accountability, the boundary intended to protect legitimate police operational discretion can instead become a mechanism through which civilian governance retreats from its own statutory responsibilities. Your argument therefore moves the conversation beyond individual board decisions and toward a more fundamental examination of how governance itself is understood.

    Ultimately, your paper leaves us with a question that extends well beyond policing: How do we know when an institution has genuinely learned from past crises and reforms, rather than simply preserving the structures and language associated with those reforms?

    And perhaps the more difficult question is: How do we recognize when previously institutionalized learning is beginning to weaken, regress, or disappear?

    Your call for boards to reclaim their statutory authority, rebuild independent expertise, demand meaningful financial scrutiny, and become willing to ask difficult questions is therefore not simply a call for stronger oversight. It is a call to rebuild governance capacity itself.

    For me, that is one of the most important contributions of this paper. It challenges us to look beyond the presence of governance structures and ask whether those structures still possess the knowledge, independence, institutional memory, and authority necessary to perform the purpose for which they were created.

    1. Alok Mukherjee Avatar

      Thank you for a very insightful and thought-provoking response, Dione. Yes, you have put your finger on the true issues underlying the symptoms, and, yes, the questions my essay raises extend well beyond policing. I hope this conversation expands.

    2. Alok Mukherjee Avatar

      @wealthisnotmoney and Dione, Interestingly, some hours ago today, I received an email from the Canadian Association of Police Governance, the national organization of police service boards, announcing the “National Police Governance Training and Development Program.” There are 3 modules for now, with more to come: Civilian-led governance of police in Canada has a rich history that can be traced back; Police Chief Management and Relationship; and Strategic Planning and Financial Management. Each module costs $99 and more modules are to come. There is a certificate on completion of the modules. Interesting questions arise. I am curious about the timing of the announcement. Coincidence?

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